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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
Case No. 
16148 
BYRON S. AMBROSE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant appeals from a jury verdict finding 
him guilty of intentionally or knowingly attempting to 
cause the death of Gordon Birrell, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-4-101 and 76-5-203 (1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was convicted by a jury of attempted 
homicide in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
District, in and for Utah County, the Honorable George E. 
Ballif, Judge, presiding. Pursuant to the verdict, Judge 
Ballif sentenced appellant to imprisonment in the Utah 
State Prison for an indeterminate term of one to fifteen 
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years, an additional term of one year to run consecutively, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1) (1953), as 
amended, and an additional term not to exceed five years 
also to run consecutively. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment and 
sentence entered by the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant was tried before a jury on September 
14 and 15, 1978, on a charge of intentionally or knowingly 
attempting to cause the death uf Gordon Birrell, in viola-
tion of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-101 and 76-5-203 (1953), 
as amended (all statutory references herein are to Utah 
Code Ann. unless otherwise indicated). Gordon Birrell 
was at the time of the shooting the husband of appellant's 
ex-wife, LaVonda Birrell. While appellant and Mrs. 
Birrell were married they had one child and appellant 
adopted Mrs. Birrell's child from a previous marriage 
(T.39). The shooting which was the focus of the charge 
in this case was precipitated by disagreement between the 
Birrells and appellant as to appellant's right to visit 
his children during the summer of 1978. 
On June 28, 1978, Gordon Birrell telephoned 
the appellant, who resided in Colorado Springs, Colorado, 
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at that time; appellant demanded to see his children 
within a short time (T.68). Mr. and Mrs. Birrell 
denied the request based upon the fact that appellant's 
visitation rights had been suspended by a judge in Las 
Vegas, Nevada, until July 31, 1978 (T.40). On July 6, 
1978, Gordon Birrell again telephoned appellant to 
recommend that they resolve the dispute through the 
Birrells' attorney. Appellant became angry and 
threatened to kill Gordon Birrell if he was not allowed 
to see his children (T.69,189). 
On August 2, 1978, appellant traveled from 
Colorado Springs to Orem, Utah, to attempt to locate the 
Birrells (T.l92). Before leaving Colorado he purchased 
a shotgun and sawed the barrel of the gun off (T.l93). 
Appellant located the Birrells' property through the 
County Recorder's Office and proceeded to the location 
on August 3, 1978 (T.l94-197). 
Mr. Birrell had on August 3, 1978, learned 
that appellant was in town, and accordingly armed 
himself with a pistol strapped to his leg (T.72). 
As appellant drove up to Birrells' property, Mr. Birrell 
recognized appellant and scrambled to take cover behind 
a tree (T.74-75). Shortly thereafter, Mr. Birrell 
was shot by appellant, sustaining wounds in the arm, 
-3-
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hand and eye (T.76-78). Appellant admitted at trial that 
he (appellant) fired the first shot, but denied that the 
shot hit Mr. Birrell (T.201). Mr. Birrell then returned 
appellant's fire by shooting at appellant's truck, 
attempting to "mark it" so that he could prove appellant 
was there (T.77). 
Appellant, after firing five shots at Mr. 
Birrell, then departed the scene and turned himself in 
to Officer Boyd Olsen of the Orem City Police, who 
placed appellant under arrest (T.l02-104). After being 
informed of his Miranda rights while at the Orem City 
Police Department, appellant told Officer Dan Howlett 
his story (T.l64-174). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROSECUTION DID NOT BREACH 
ANY DUTY TO APPELLANT TO PRESERVE 
EVIDENCE. 
Appellant contends that he was denied his 
right to due process because the prosecution "failed to 
preserve" the truck which the appellant drove to and 
from the scene of the crime. After the Orem City Police 
took photographs of the truck to be used in evidence, the 
truck was released to the registered owner who resided in 
Colorado (T.lSl). Appellant alleges that the police 
-4-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
should not have released the truck and that such conduct 
constitutes destruction or suppression of evidence material 
to his guilt or innocence. Specifically, appellant urges 
that "If the accused had the opportunity to test the 
evidence, he may have bolstered his credibility before 
the jury and received an acquital [sic]." Appellant's 
Brief, p. 6. 
Under the standards set by cases cited by 
appellant and by other cases, appellant has failed to 
allege or prove error sufficient to require reversal of 
his conviction. First, there was no "loss" or "destruction" 
of evidence in the case at bar such as was involved in the 
cases cited by appellant involving destruction of the 
results of breathalyzer tests or loss or destruction of 
tape recordings. See, e.g., People v. Harmes, 560 P.2d 
470 (Colo. App. 1976); Scales v. City Court, City of 
Mesa, 594 P.2d 97 (Ariz. 1979). In this case, the truck 
was available to appellant and his trial counsel to conduct 
independent tests throughout the time that the truck was 
impounded by the Orem City Police. Nevertheless, appellant 
made no request to make such tests during that time. In 
addition, even after the truck was released to the true 
owners, appellant could have issued a subpoena to obtain 
access to the truck to perform tests. Thus, the evidence 
-5-
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was not "lost" to the appellant in the sense that a 
videotape or recorded tape may be lost by destruction. 
For example, in People v. Harmes, 560 P.2d 470 (Colo. 
App. 1976), relied upon by appellant, the court 
emphasized that destruction of a videotape of the 
assault for which the defendant was charged precluded 
the defendant from ever demonstrating whether or not 
he was guilty. 
Finally, the photographs of the truck taken 
by the police were made available to appellant's trial 
counsel during the trial, and were actually introduced 
into evidence as defendant's exhibits (T.l40-142). The 
relevant "evidence" as to the bullet markings on and 
damage to the truck was before the jury and appellant 
had the opportunity to raise any possible defenses based 
upon this evidence. Respondent submits that the prosecution 
here complied with the recommendation of this Court in 
State v. Stewart, 544 P.2d 477 (Utah 1975): 
We think it advisable that those 
charged with investigation and prosecu-
tion of crime should retain intact all 
records and ether evidence pertaining 
to the case until it is finally disposed 
of. 
544 P.2d 479. The truck itself could not have been 
introduced in evidence at the trial. However, the 
prosecution took photographs of the truck and preserved 
and made them available at trial. The prosecution has 
-6-
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no affirmative duty to anticipate a defendant's defenses 
nor to affirmatively collect and produce evidence which 
would be favorable to the defense, especially where 
the source of such evidence is equally available to the 
defense. S~ate v. Totten, 577 P.2d 1165 (Ida. 1978); 
State v. Falk, 567 P.2d 235 (Wash.App. 1977). Thus, 
there was in this case no "loss" or "destruction" of the 
truck and it follows that the prosecution did not breach 
its duty to preserve evidence. 
Two cases decided by the United States Supreme 
Court have established a general rule regarding suppression 
of evidence by the prosecution. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83 (1963), Brady and his companion, Boblit, were 
convicted of first-degree murder and were sentenced to 
death. Brady's counsel specifically requested before 
trial that the prosecution disclose any extrajudicial 
statements made by Boblit in the possession of the 
prosecution. Although some statements were turned over, 
one was not, which contained an admission that Boblit 
had done the actual killing. In Brady's post-conviction 
hearing, the Maryland Court of Appeals held this 
suppression violated defendant's right to due process 
and remanded the case for reconsideration of the punishment, 
but not the guilt, of Brady. 
-7-
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In what has since become known as the "Brady 
rule," the United States Supreme Court wrote: 
We now hold that the suppression 
by the prosecution of evidence favorable 
to an accused upon request violates due 
process where the evldence is material 
either to guilt or to punishment, 
irrespective of the good or bad faith 
of the prosecution. 
373 U.S. 83, 87. Thus, the rule adopted in Brady applies 
where the defense made a request for the material 
allegedly suppressed before trial. 
The Supreme Court further clarified the Brady 
rule in United States v. Agurs, 427 u.s. 97 (1976). In 
Agurs, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder 
for killing James Sewell with a knife. The defendant and 
sewell had engaged in intercourse in a motel room, Sewell 
then left briefly, and when he returned, apparently found 
defendant attempting to steal his money. A struggle ensued 
in which Sewell was stabbed by the defendant with one of 
two knives Sewell had been carrying. At trial, the 
defendant alleged that she acted in self-defense and that 
Sewell was a violent person. 
Defendant's counsel discovered after trial that 
Sewell had a prior criminal record, including charges of 
carrying a deadly weapon (a knife), and that the prosecution 
knew of this record but failed to disclose it to the defense. 
-8-
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Defendant's motion for a new trial based upon "newly 
discovered" evidence was denied by the district court 
judge who found that the evidence was not material. 
The Court of Appeals reversed, on the basis of the fact 
that if the evidence had been disclosed it "might" have 
affected the jury verdict. 
The United States Supreme Court carefully 
distinguished this case from Brady, supra: 
In Brady, the request was specific. 
It gave the prosecutor notice of exactly 
what the defense desired. Although 
there is, of course, no duty to provide 
defense counsel with unlimited discovery 
of everything known by the prosecutor, if 
the subject matter is material, or indeed 
if a substantial basis for claiming 
materiality exists, it is reasonable to 
require the prosecutor to respond either 
by furnishing the information or by 
submitting the problem to the trial 
judge. When the prosecutor receives a 
specific and relevant request, the 
failure to make any response is seldom, 
if ever, excusable. 
427 U.S. 97 (emphasis added). However, in cases in which 
the defendant or his counsel either makes no request or 
makes a general request for "any exculpatory material," 
the latter of which the Court states is the same as making 
no request at all, a different standard applies. 
In such cases, the information in the possession 
of the prosecution is generally unknown to the defense and 
thus the issue becomes when the prosecutor must volunteer 
information from his files to the defense. The Court, in 
-9-
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answering this question, focuses on the concern that the 
failure to disclose is of "sufficient significance to 
result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair 
trial," 427 U.S. 97, 108. In rejecting the standard of 
"materiality" of the undisclosed evidence adopted 
by the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court wrote: 
The mere possibility that an 
item of undisclosed information might 
have helped the defense, or might 
have affected the outcome of the trial, 
does not establish "materiality" in the 
constitutional sense. 
427 U.S. 97, 109-110. Rather: 
The proper standard of materiality 
must reflect our overriding concern with 
the justice of the finding of guilt. 
Such a finding is permissible only if 
supported by evidence establishing guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. It necessarily 
follows that if the omitted evidence creates 
a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise 
exist, constitutional error has been 
committed. This means that the omission 
must be evaluated in the context of the 
entire record. If there is no reasonable 
doubt about guilt or whether or not the 
additional evidence is considered, there 
is no justification for a new trial. 
427 U.S. 97, 112-113. In a case as the present one where 
there is no specific request for disclosure of exculpatory 
material, the prosecution has a duty to sua _sponte turn 
evidence over to the defense only where the evidence would 
have created a reasonable doubt as to guilt which did not 
otherwise exist. 
-10-
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Respondent submits that under the Agurs standard, 
appellant has not established that had he been able to 
introduce evidence as to the truck it would have created 
a reasonable doubt as to his guilt which did not otherwise 
exist. Appellant has never contested that he was present 
at the scene of the crime, that he fired five shots from 
a shotgun at Gordon Birrell, or that he drove a white 
Dodge pickup to and from the scene of the crime. Rather, 
he alleges only that if he had performed independent 
ballistics tests and introduced such evidence it might 
have "bolstered his credibility" before the jury. 
Bolstering credibility is not the same as creating an 
otherwise absent reasonable doubt as to guilt or 
innocence. It should be noted that appellant has not 
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to authorize 
his conviction. See Taylor v. State, 253 S.E.2d 191, 194 
(Ga. 1979). 
Further, several courts have recognized that 
where evidence is equally available to both the prosecution 
and the defense, there can be no "suppression" of such 
evidence by the prosecution. In the case of Anderson v. 
Leake, 248 S.E.2d 120 (S.C. 1978), the Supreme Court of 
south Carolina, in discussing the issue of prosecutorial 
suppression of evidence, wrote: 
-11-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Although not expressly stated in the 
opinion, we think it is implicit that the 
Brady rule applies only to favorable evidence 
which the prosecution has but which is 
unavailable to the defendant. . . 
[W]here the evidence is equally 
available to the accused, the obligation 
on the part of the State to furnish such 
evidence to the accused is relieved. 
248 S.E.2d 120, 122 (emphasis in original). 
The Court in Anderson cited with approval this 
Court's holding in Ward v. Turner, 12 Utah 2d 310, 366 P.2d 
72 (1961), to the same effect. Since the truck in the case 
at bar was equally available to appellant and to the state, 
there was no prosecutorial "suppression" of material 
evidence. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS 
RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
Appellant alleges that he was denied his 
constitutional right to effective assistance of 
counsel in the trial of this case. Specifically, 
appellant complains that his counsel's failure to take 
adequate steps to preserve the availability of the 
truck which appellant drove to the scene of the crime 
(see Point I, supra) or to move for dismissal based upon 
the "loss" of the truck as evidence constituted ineffective 
assistance. 
-12-
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Appellant correctly identifies the case of 
State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203 (Utah 1976), as stating 
the standard set by this Court in evaluating a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel: 
. the right of the accused to 
have counsel is not satisfied by a sham 
or pretense of an appearance in the 
record by an attorney who manifests no 
real concern about the interests of the 
accused. He is entitled to the assistance 
of a competent member of the Bar, who 
shows a willingness to identify himself 
with the interests of the accused and 
present such defenses as are available 
under the law and consistent with the 
ethics of the profession ... 
The record must establish that 
counsel was ignorant of the facts or the 
law, resulting in withdrawal of a crucial 
defense, reducing the trial to a "farce 
and a sham." 
554 P.2d 202, 204. This Court further stated in McNicol: 
A defendant bears the burden of 
establishing the inadequacy or ineffective-
ness of counsel, and proof of such must be 
a d~~onstrable reality and not a 
speculative matter. 
554 P.2d 202, 204. Respondent submits that appellant has 
failed to meet this burden in that his allegations do not 
establish with any degree of certainty what "crucial 
defense" was not presented on the basis of the failure to 
preserve the truck as evidence. 
As discussed in Point I, supra, appellant's 
only contention with respect to the truck is that had he 
-13-
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been able to perform independent ballistics tests he "may 
have bolstered his credibility before the jury." This 
does not establish the withdrawal of a crucial defense, 
but is rather a matter of pure speculation, which does 
not support the claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
This Court has recognized that counsel's 
performance should not be evaluated in the benefit of 
hindsight and that the failure to make certain motions 
or objections which would have been futile if raised 
does not constitute ineffective assistance. State v. 
McNicol, supra; Heinlin v. Smith, 542 Po2d 1081 {Utah 
1975). Since appellant's claim of loss or destruction 
of the truck as evidence is groundless {see Point I, 
supra), a motion to dismiss on that ground by his trial 
counsel would have been uselesso. 
In Alires v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118, 449 P.2d 
241 {1969) , this Court recognized that an important 
inquiry in deciding upon a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel is whether better representation might have 
had some effect on the result of the trial. If such a 
probable different result does not appear, there is no 
prejudicial error warranting reversal of the conviction. 
-14-
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To the same effect is the statement in the recent case of 
State of Utah v. James M. Gray, No. 15550, decided October 
2, 1979: 
There is the further proposition to 
be considered: that even if his counsel 
did not perform as skillfully as the 
now-convicted defendant might have desired, 
his guilt was so clearly evident that even 
in the absence of any misjudgment of 
counsel we do not believe there is any 
reasonable likelihood that there would 
have been a different result, wherefore, 
there should be no reversal of the 
conviction. The defendant has not 
established anything more than mere 
speculation as to prejudice because of 
ineffectiveness of his counsel. 
Id. at page 3 of the opinion. 
Respondent submits that in the case here, 
appellant's guilt of the crime charged was proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt. There is no likelihood that even 
had his trial counsel performed tests upon the truck and 
introduced such evidence at trial the appellant would not 
have been found guilty based upon the evidence presented 
by the state and the fact that appellant did not seriously 
dispute his involvement in the shooting. This case 
presents an example of the concern voiced by Justice 
Crockett in State v. Harris, 30 Utah 2d 354, 517 P.2d 
1313 (1974): 
-15-
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. . . we are impelled to remark 
that it is nothing less than shameful 
that our law seems to have degenerated 
to a point where whenever an accused is 
convicted of crime, the charge of 
incompetency of counsel is, with ever 
increasing frequency, leveled at capable 
attorneys who have given entirely adequate 
service, when the real difficulty was 
that he had a guilty client. 
517 P.2d 1313, 1315. 
Based upon the foregoing argument, appellant 
was given effective assistance of counsel at trial and 
thus his conviction should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS 
RIGHT TO TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY. 
Appellant alleges that the trial judge failed 
to take proper measures to isolate the jury from possibly 
prejudicial information. During the trial, Frank Mitchell, 
the victim of a crime for which appellant had previously 
been tried entered the courtroom. Judge Balli£ immediately 
called a recess, and held a hearing in his chambers with 
both counsel, appellant, and Mr. Mitchell present (T.ll3-
114). In that hearing the following exchange occurred: 
THE COURT: And what is your 
position, Mr. Mitchell? Why are -you 
here? Did you realize the possibility 
exists of any kind of disruption that 
may occur with your presence here 
because of the prior incident? 
MR. MITCHELL: No, sir. 
-16-
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THE COURT: It could cause a mis-
trial in this case. 
MR. MITHCELL: I didn't know that, 
sir. 
THE COURT: Apparently you hadn't 
been advised of that fact, and that is 
why I recessed proceedings in this 
matter. I would hope that you would 
understand that, and I'm going to have 
to ask you if you will leave for that 
very reason. 
HR. MITCHELL: Okay. I just 
thought the trial was open to the 
public. 
THE COURT: It is. But this is a 
matter where I know there are some very 
hard feelings and some very serious 
problems between the two sides here in 
this matter, and we just don't want to 
have any error committed in this trial. 
I don't want to have to try it again. 
I hope we have handled this in a way that 
we have done it without any embarrassment 
to you. I hope, if you don't mind, that 
you will leave. 
MR. MITCHELL: Can I stay on this 
floor? 
THE COURT: I think it would be 
better if you weren't here right now. 
I think we would all feel more comfortable 
about the situation, and we would be able 
to pay full attention to the matter of a 
good legal, fair trial, if you would 
leave the area here. 
MR. MITCHELL: Okay. 
THE COURT: I appreciate that very 
much. Thank you. 
(T.ll3-114). Judge Ballif thus requested that Mr. 
Mitchell leave the area, which he apparently did. 
It should also be noted that Judge Ballif 
was very careful to admonish the jury not to talk to 
anyone else or between themselves about the case while 
-17-
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the court was in recess. He emphasized this necessity 
at the start of the trial in light of the fact that 
there was no jury room in the courthouse (T.l8,80, 
112,160,221,238). 
Appellant has failed to allege that there 
was in fact any contact between Mr. Mitchell and any 
of the jurors. Allegations of possible contact do not 
establish prejudicial, reversible error. Nevertheless, 
it is apparent from the record in this case that no 
such contact did occur. The following exchange occurred 
just prior to Judge Ballif's instructing the jury: 
MR. MUSSELMAN: I have one thing 
further, your Honor. We would ask 
that the Court informally, prior to, 
or as a part of the instructions, ask or 
encourage the jurors, in the event anyone 
has tried to discuss the case with them 
outside of the court, to bring that to the 
attention of the Court. I don't want to 
imply that anyone has, but if they have, 
we would like to be sure that they call 
that to the Court's attention. 
My reason for the request is that 
after our discussion yesterday, Mr. Frank 
Mitchell remained in the building down near 
the snack bar--
THE COURT: He was off this floor? 
Wasn't that my order? 
MR. MUSSELMAN: Was it just off this 
floor? 
THE COURT: I thought it was, yes. 
HR. A!1BROSE: You told him to get out. 
THE COURT: Well, I meant off this 
floor. 
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MR. MUSSELMAN: I remember him 
asking if he couldn't stay around this 
floor, and the Court asked him to 
leave, and probably the intent was just 
to leave this floor. 
THE COURT: It was. 
MR. MUSSELMAN: I'm not saying 
that he violated the Court's order. I'm 
just saying that in the event there was 
any discussion, or any attempt to 
influence the jurors on their way out, 
and I don't want to tell them that in that 
respect, but I would just request that the 
Court, in a general manner, and if it can 
sound like part of the instructions, encourage 
the jurors to bring that to the Court's 
attention, and that it is their duty if 
anyone has tried to do that. 
THE COURT: All right. 
(The following proceedings are being 
held in the courtroom with the jurors and 
all court personnel being present. These 
proceedings are starting at 9:45 a.m.) 
THE COURT: Before the Court proceeds 
with the reading of the Instructions to the 
jury, I want to make a few comments. First 
of all, I hope you understand that the 
comments I make to you about out-of-court 
communications would mean, and carry with 
it the obligation on your part to convey to 
the Court any attempt anyone would make to 
influence you, or in any way comment about 
the case to you out of the court. And I 
assume that you would have done that, 
had that occurred? That has not occurred, 
as I understand it? All right. Fine. 
Thank you very much. 
(T.242-243). The jurors were not in fact contacted or 
approached by Mr. Mitchell or anyone else and thus were 
not improperly influenced by outside sources. Appellant 
was not denied his right to trial by an impartial jury and 
his conviction should be affirmed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that the appellant has failed 
to allege or prove any prejudicial error occurring at his 
trial, as is shown in the foregoing argument and citation 
of authorities. Wherefore, respondent urges this Court 
to affirm appellant's conviction and sentence. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General· 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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